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Abstract 
The objective of this research was to analyse the influence of Corporate Governance 
consisted of institutional ownership, size of board of commissioners, board of 
independent commissioners’ composition; leverage, and audit quality on earnings 
management with firm size as moderating variable in consumer goods companies listed 
in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research used associative causal method. The 
population was 14 companies, and all of them were used as the samples, taken by using 
census technique so that there were 98 observations all together. The data were 
gathered by conducting documentary study and analysed by using panel data regression 
analysis. The result of the research showed that, simultaneously, Corporate Governance 
consisted of institutional ownership, size of board of commissioners, board of 
independent commissioners’ composition; leverage, and audit quality had the significant 
influence on earnings management. Partially, the size of board of commissioners and 
leverage had the positive and significant influence on earnings management, besides 
institutional ownership, board of independent commissioners’ composition, audit quality 
had influence not significant on earnings management. The result of residual test on 
moderating variable showed that firm size could moderate the correlation of Corporate 
Governance consisted of institutional ownership, size of board of commissioners, board 
of independent commissioners’ composition; leverage, and audit quality with earnings 
management in consumer goods companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
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I.  Introduction 
Profit is an indicator to measure the performance of a company, where the greater the 
profit generated by the company, the better the performance of management. Earnings 
information can be found in the company's financial statements. Financial statements 
serve as a means of communicating financial information to interested parties in making 
decisions. Management is fully aware that this earnings information becomes the focal 
point of attention of decision makers so that it motivates the emergence of deviant 
behavior from management, one of which is earnings management (Prasetya and 
Gayatri, 2016). 
Earnings management in practice is still controversial because some researchers say 
that earnings management is a natural and ethical thing to do as long as in practice it 
does not conflict with applicable accounting standards (Fischer and Rosenzweigh, 
1995). On the other hand, earnings management is considered as a management action 
that carries a negative influence and tends to mislead users of information in financial 
reporting, where there are interventions by managers with the aim of maximizing the 
manager's personal profit (Schipper, 1989). Earnings management arises as a result of 
agency conflict, where there are differences in interests between the owner of the 
company (principal) and company management (agent). 
The recent case of earnings management is a scandal by a Toshiba company. 
According to an independent committee, the company inflated operating profits by ¥ 
151.8 billion ($ 1.2 billion) over seven years. As a result of the accounting scandal that 
rocked the company, Toshiba's shares have dropped by around 20% since early April 
when these accounting issues were revealed. The market value of the company lost 
around 1,673 trillion yen ($ 13.4 billion) and analysts expect Toshiba's shares to 
continue to decline. Toshiba, which is one of the most recognized electronic brands in 
the world and has a good reputation, is now falling apart due to the accounting scandal 
that carried out the company. 
Consumer goods companies are among the publicly listed companies that register 
their shares on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This sector is one of the favorite sectors 
of investors' choice, as evidenced in 2017 the sector's market capitalization reached IDR 
1,575.75 trillion or 22.62% of the total market capitalization in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, making it the sector with the second largest market capitalization in 
Indonesia after the financial sector. This sector is relatively stable from economic 
fluctuations, because the products produced by companies in this sector are always 
needed in any economic conditions, so the demand for the products of this sector is 
relatively constant (Sukamulja, 2017). From the explanation above, the researcher is 
interested in conducting a research entitled "Analysis of the Effect of Corporate 
Governance, Leverage, and Audit Quality on Profit Management with Company Size as 
Moderating Variables in Consumer Goods Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange". 
 
II.  Literature Review 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory describes the meeting point between the owner of the company 
(principal) and management (agent) within a company. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
308) state "agency relationship as contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal (s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. While Scott 
(2009) defines agency theory "Agency theory is a branch of game theory that studies the 
design of contracts to motivate rational agents on behalf of the agents of interest would 
otherwise conflict with those of the principal". 
The Principal employs agents to carry out duties in the interests of the principal, 
including delegating authorization to decision making from the principal to the agent. 
The principal enters into a contract to maximize his well-being with increasing 
profitability while the agent is motivated to maximize fulfillment of his economic and 
psychological needs so that opportunistic behaviour from the agent, namely behaviour 
to maximize his own welfare which is contrary to the interests of the principal, will 
emerge. Opportunistic behaviour is based on more information knowledge about the 
company than the principal as an impact of the transfer of company management to the 
agent. This gives the agent the flexibility to choose and apply accounting methods that 
can show good performance for the purpose of getting bonuses from the principal. 
Mastery of information by agents is often misused to take actions in accordance 
with the wishes and interests of maximizing its utility by presenting information that is 
not true to the principal, especially if the information is related to measuring the 
performance of the agent. The imbalance in mastering information that is known 
between principals and agents is called information asymmetry. 
 
Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory emphasizes the importance of information issued by companies on 
investment decisions of parties outside the company. Information is an important 
element for investors and business people because information essentially presents 
information, notes or descriptions for both past, present and future conditions for the 
survival of a company and how the market effects. Complete, relevant, accurate and 
timely information is needed by investors in the capital market as an analytical tool for 
making investment decisions. 
 Information published as an announcement will signal investors in making 
investment decisions (Jogiyanto, 2000: 392). If the announcement contains a positive 
value, it is expected that the market will react when the announcement is received by 
the market. When information is announced and all market participants have received 
the information, market participants first interpret and analye the information as a good 
news or bad news. 
 
Earnings Management 
Earnings management is an act of managers to choose accounting policies or actions 
that affect earnings in order to achieve certain goals in reporting earnings (Scott, 2009: 
403). Scott (2009) divides ways of understanding earnings management into two. First, 
seeing it as an opportunistic agent of managers to maximize their utility in the face of 
compensation contracts, debt contracts and political costs (Opportunistic Earnings 
Management). Second, by looking at earnings management from perspective efficient 
contracting (Efficient Earnings Management), where earnings management gives 
managers a flexibility to protect themselves and the company in anticipating unexpected 
events for the benefit of the parties involved in the contract. There are three ways that 
can be used to do earnings management, namely: utilizing opportunities to make 
accounting estimates, change accounting methods, and shift the period of costs or 
income. 
 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is defined as a set of rules that determine the relationship 
between shareholders, managers, creditors, governments, employees, and other internal 
and external stakeholders in accordance with their rights and responsibilities. The 
corporate governance mechanism consists of several variable indicators. In this study 
the indicators used by researchers are institutional ownership, board size, and the 
composition of independent commissioners. 
a. Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of company shares by financial 
institutions such as insurance companies, banks, pension funds, and investment 
banking (Siregar & Utama, 2005). Institutional ownership is believed to have the 
ability to monitor management actions better than individual investors. Through 
the mechanism of institutional ownership, the effectiveness of management of 
company resources by management can be seen from information generated 
through market reactions to earnings announcements. Institutional ownership has 
the ability to control management through an effective monitoring process that 
reduces management actions to manage earnings. The percentage of certain shares 
owned by the institution can affect the process of preparing financial statements 
that do not rule out the possibility of accrualisation according to the interests of 
the management (Ujiyantho and Pramuka, 2007). 
b. Board of Commissioner 
The Board of Commissioners is defined as a corporate organization that is 
collectively responsible and responsible for supervising and providing advice to 
directors and ensuring that the company implements good corporate governance. 
The board size of commissioners is the number of all members of the board of 
commissioners who come from internal and external companies who supervise 
the directors in running the company. The increasing number of members of the 
board of commissioners, it will be difficult in carrying out their roles, including 
difficulties in communicating and coordinating the work of each member of the 
board itself, difficulties in monitoring and controlling management actions and 
difficulties in making decisions that are useful for the company. 
c. Composition of the Independent Board of Commissioners 
Independent Commissioners have responsibility for the quality of information from 
financial statements. According to the National Committee on Good Corporate 
Governance (2004), independent commissioners are commissioners who are not 
affiliated with management, other members of the board of commissioners and 
controlling shareholders, and are free from business relationships and other 
relationships that can affect their ability to act independently or act solely eyes for 
the sake of the company. 
 
Leverage  
The practice of earnings management is associated with a new theory in accounting, 
namely positive accounting theory or positive accounting theory. Positive accounting 
theory is an accounting theory that seeks to reveal that certain economic factors or 
characteristics of a particular business unit can be associated with the behaviour of 
managers or financial report makers. Leverage is an agreement between a company as a 
debtor and a creditor. In this debt agreement, there is a company's interest to be 
positively valued by creditors in terms of their ability to pay their debts. The greater the 
leverage ratio, the higher the value of the company's debt. Thus, a company that has a 
high leverage ratio, means the proportion of its debt is higher than the proportion of its 
assets will tend to manipulate in the form of earnings management. This aims to avoid 
violations of debt agreements (Astuti, 2004). In addition, the existence of a debt 
contract agreement triggers management to increase its discretionary accrual with the 
aim of showing positive performance to creditors, so that they get an injection of funds 
or to get a debt repayment scheduling. 
 
Audit Quality 
Companies need to conduct audits by using outside parties to provide endorsement of 
financial statements in order to reduce the inconsistency in information found in 
managers and shareholders (Meutia, 2004). Public accountants as external auditors who 
are relatively more independent than management than internal auditors are expected to 
minimize profit engineering cases and increase the credibility of accounting information 
in financial statements. 
Larger public accounting offices are assumed to produce better audit quality as 
well. The difference in the quality of services offered by public accounting firms shows 
the identity of the public accounting firm. Auditor independence and quality can have 
an impact on the detection of earnings management. There are allegations that reputable 
auditors can detect the possibility of earning management earlier so that it can reduce 
the level of earnings management carried out by company management. 
 
Firm Size 
Firm size can be known from the total assets of the company, where the greater the 
number of company assets, the greater the size of the company (Jin and Machfoedz, 
1998: 180). The results of research by Jin and Machfoedz (1998) show that firm size is 
a factor that encourages the practice of earnings management. The larger the size of the 
company, the more information available to investors in making more decisions and 
minimizing the possibility of information asymmetry that can lead to the practice of 
earnings management in the company. 
 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis 
This research is quantitative research. Based on the previous explanation, eat the 
conceptual framework in the research as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Based on the introduction described, the research hypothesis can be developed as 
follows: 
a. Institutional Ownership negatively affects Profit Management in consumer 
goods companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
b. The size of the Board of Commissioners has a positive effect on Profit 
Management in consumer goods companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
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c. The composition of the Independent Board of Commissioners negatively 
affects Profit Management in consumer goods companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
d. Leverage has a positive effect on Profit Management in consumer goods 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
e. Audit quality negatively affects Profit Management in consumer goods 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
f. Company Size can moderate the effect of Corporate Governance, Leverage, 
and Audit Quality on Profit Management in consumer goods companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
III.  Method 
The population in this study were all consumer goods companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange which respectively published their financial statements in 2011-2017. 
The total population in the study was 14 companies. The sampling method is a census, 
which is the entire population as a sample. Thus, the number of samples in this study 
were 14 companies with an observation period of 7 years (2011-2017) so that the 
amount of research data was 14 x 7 years = 98 company data. 
The data used in this research is secondary data. Testing is done using the E-views 
application. The independent variables in this study are institutional ownership (IO), 
board size of commissioner (BSC), composition of independent board of commissioners 
(CIBC), leverage (LEV), and audit quality (AQ). The dependent variable is earnings 
management (EM). The moderating variable is the firm size (FS). 
 
Research Model 
To analyse the hypothesis, the following data panel regression estimates are used: 
EM = a + b1IO+ b2BSC+ b3CIBC+ b4LEV + b5AQ+ e 
Information: 
EM  : Earnings Management 
a  : Constants 
IO  : Institutional Ownership 
BSC  : Size of the Board of Commissioners 
CIBC  : Composition of the Independent Board of Commissioners 
LEV  : Leverage 
AQ  : Audit Quality 
b1, b2, b3, b4, b5: regression coefficients 
e  : error 
 
IV.  Result and Discussion 
Result 
Sample data in the study were analysed using the E-views application. This research 
begins by looking at whether the data is normally distributed or not by performing a 
data normality test. If the probability value is greater than α = 0.05 and the Jarque - Bera 
(JB) value <5.9915 then the residual is normally distributed. The results of the 
normality test can be seen from the picture below: 
 
Figure 2 Normality Test Result 
Based on the picture above, it can be concluded that the data is normally 
distributed. Testing the hypothesis in this study using the estimation results of the 
Random Effect Model (REM) regression model. In testing the hypothesis, the 
coefficient of determination analysis will be carried out, testing for simultaneous 
influence (F test), and testing for partial influence (t test). The results of the test, can be 
seen in the following table: 
Table 1 Determination Coefficient Test, F Test, t Test 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
IO? 0.028345 0.017910 1.582624 0.1169 
BSC? 0.293869 0.136183 2.157891 0.0335 
CIBC? -1.664237 1.583605 -1.050917 0.2960 
LEV? 2.215073 0.942389 2.350487 0.0209 
AQ? -1.006888 0.823339 -1.222933 0.2245 
C -5.806740 1.514603 -3.833835 0.0002 
     
     
R-squared 0.158269    Mean dependent var -0.939600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112523    S.D. dependent var 1.294073 
S.E. of regression 1.219095    Sum squared resid 136.7296 
F-statistic 3.459724    Durbin-Watson stat 1.474178 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.006553    
 
Based on the results of table 1, it can be concluded that the size of the board of 
commissioners and leverage has a positive and significant effect on earnings 
management. Whereas institutional ownership, the composition of the independent 
board of commissioners, and audit quality have an influence, but not significantly to 
earnings management. Prob Value (F-statistics), which is 0.006553 <0.05, it can be 
concluded that all independent variables, namely institutional ownership (IO), board of 
commissioner size (BSC), composition of independent commissioners (CIBC), leverage 
(LEV), and audit quality (AQ) simultaneously has a significant effect on earnings 
management (EM) variables. R2 (adjusted R2) value is 0.112523, meaning IO, BSC, 
CIBC, LEV, AQ are able to explain EM simultaneously or together at 11.25%, the 
remaining 88.75% is influenced by other factors. To test whether company size can 
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moderate the relationship between IO, BSC, CIBC, LEV, and AQ with earnings 
management, a residual test is conducted with the following results: 
Table 2 Residual Test Results 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ML -3.07E+11 1.10E+11 -2.781973 0.0065 
C 1.21E+12 3.48E+11 3.484996 0.0007 
     
          
     In table 2 it can be seen that the regression coefficient of EM is -3.07 × 1011 
(negative value) and significant (Prob. 0.0065 <0.05). This means that UP is significant 
in moderating the influence of IO, BSC, CIBC, LEV, and AQ on EM. 
 
Discussion 
Based on the research results obtained through the various tests mentioned above, it can 
be interpreted that the influence of the independent and dependent variables and the 
moderating variables are as follows: 
a. Effect of Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management 
The results of this study indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and not 
significant effect on earnings management. This means that the presence or absence 
of institutional ownership in a company, does not hinder the desire of managers to 
do earnings management to attract potential investors where investors are more 
interested in relatively stable or increasing profits. These results also indicate that 
institutional investors are investors who focus on current earnings, thus 
encouraging managers to conduct earnings management to meet profit goals from 
investors. 
b. Effect of Board of Commissioners' Size on Earnings Management 
The results of this study provide empirical evidence that the size of the board of 
commissioners has a positive and significant effect on earnings management. This 
means that a large size of the board of commissioners has an impact on increasing 
earnings management, because the more the board of commissioners will make it 
difficult for them to carry out their roles, including difficulty in communicating and 
coordinating the work of each member of the board, difficulties in monitoring and 
controlling actions from management, as well as difficulties in making decisions 
that are useful for the company. 
c. Effect of Independent Board of Commissioners Composition on Earnings 
Management 
The results of this study indicate that the composition of the independent board of 
commissioners has a negative and not significant effect on earnings management. 
This means that the composition of a high independent board of commissioners 
does not necessarily have the effect of reducing earnings management. From these 
results it shows that the independent board of commissioners who are part of the 
company's commissioners do not perform a function of good supervision of 
management, thus allowing management to manipulate financial statements. 
d. Effect of Leverage on Earnings Management 
The results of this study indicate that leverage has a positive and significant effect 
on earnings management. This means that high leverage has an impact on 
increasing earnings management. The relationship between leverage and earnings 
management practices is explained using the debt agreement theory of positive 
accounting theory. High leverage is found to correlate closely with violations of 
debt agreements (Press and Weintrop, 1990). Thus, managers in companies with 
high leverage tend to do earnings management and choose accounting procedures 
that improve earnings reporting. In addition, high leverage can also be associated 
with financial pressure, where financially troubled companies tend to have large 
negative accruals relating to renegotiation contracts that provide incentives to 
reduce profits. 
e. Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management 
The results of this study indicate that audit quality has a negative and not 
significant effect on earnings management. This means that high audit quality does 
not necessarily have an impact on decreasing earnings management. Quality, 
relevant and trustworthy financial reports are generated from audits carried out 
effectively by qualified auditors. Public accountants as external auditors who are 
relatively more independent of management than internal auditors, are expected to 
minimize profit engineering cases and increase the credibility of accounting 
information in financial statements. The use of high-quality auditors is expected to 
reduce the opportunity for companies to cheat in presenting inaccurate information 
to the public. In this study, it can be seen that high auditor quality or audited by Big 
4 KAP, may not necessarily suppress earnings management behaviour carried out 
by the company. This is because managers have more information related to the 
company than outside parties in line with what is described in the asymmetry 
information, thus giving managers the freedom to do earnings management. 
f. Effect of Firm Size as Moderating Variable 
The moderating test results using the residual test show that the regression 
coefficient of earnings management is negative at -3.07 × 1011 and significant. 
Negative and significant values can be interpreted that the size of the company is 
able to moderate the influence of institutional ownership, board size, independent 
board composition, leverage, and audit quality on earnings management. 
 
V.  Conclusion and Suggestion 
Conclusion 
This study examines whether corporate governance is measured by institutional 
ownership, board size of commissioners, composition of independent commissioners; 
leverage; and audit quality has an influence on earnings management with company size 
as a moderating variable in consumer goods companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2011-2017. From the results of the statistical tests that have been 
conducted, some conclusions can be drawn as follows: 
a. Institutional ownership has a positive and insignificant effect on earnings 
management, where the presence or absence of institutional ownership in a 
company does not hinder the manager's desire to do earnings management to 
attract potential investors where investors are more interested in relatively stable 
or increasing profits. 
b. The board size of commissioners has a positive and significant effect on earnings 
management, where a large size of the board of commissioners has an impact on 
increasing earnings management, because the more the board of commissioners 
will make it difficult for them to play a role that will provide management 
opportunities for earnings management. 
c. The composition of the independent board of commissioners has a negative and 
insignificant effect on earnings management, which indicates that the independent 
board of commissioners does not perform a good oversight function of 
management. 
d. Leverage has a positive and significant effect on earnings management. This is in 
accordance with the debt agreement theory of positive accounting theory, where 
management will be motivated to do earnings management to avoid violating the 
debt agreement. 
e. Audit quality has a negative and insignificant effect on earnings management, 
where high auditor quality or audited by Big 4 KAP cannot necessarily suppress 
management behaviour to conduct earnings management. 
f. Firm size is able to moderate the influence of institutional ownership, board size, 
independent board composition, leverage, and audit quality on earnings 
management. 
 
Suggestion 
Some suggestions that researchers ask for several parties, namely: 
a. For the next researcher, it is suggested to add other independent variables such as 
compensation bonuses, profitability, the effect of IFRS adoption, Free Cash Flow, 
Green Accounting or other variables that might affect earnings management. 
b. Using populations and samples outside the company of the consumer goods sector 
and adding a longer period of bonding. 
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